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Abstract 
 
Based on the significance of a Minimum Variance Portfolio (MVP) for the understanding of dollarization
equilibria, a significant strand of the debate concerned with the driving forces behind this phenomenon 
has focused on analyzing the determinants of the relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation. 
This analysis contributes in the identification of those factors by extending the basic CAPM formulation
via the introduction of credit risk that is directly linked to the shock that determines real returns for
dollar denominated assets: unanticipated shifts in the real exchange rate. We show this ingredient can end
up altering the perceived relative volatility of peso and dollar assets in a way that fuels financial 
dollarization (by increasing the relative hedging opportunities offered by the latter). We calibrate our
model using Peruvian data for the period 1998-2004, and its predictions show a better fit with observed 
financial dollarization ratios than those of the basic CAPM model. 
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1 Motivation 
While the term “dollarization” is broad enough to cover the process by which the national 
currency is substituted by a foreign one in any of its three functions, it must be stressed that the 
early literature on the topic2  was particularly concerned with the role of money as a means of 
exchange and, thus, dollarization was regarded as a currency substitution phenomenon. Under 
this scenario, one could claim that dollarization complicates and could ultimately render 
monetary policy as ineffective due to the instability of money demand. Clearly, this argument 
proves particularly relevant when the phenomenon behind the term “dollarization” is currency 
substitution, and when monetary policy is implemented by targeting some narrow monetary 
aggregate.  
 
Despite the presence of severe data restrictions when it comes to account for cash holdings in 
foreign currency, empirical evidence points towards a significant reduction of the currency 
substitution phenomenon in most emerging economies during the last decade. On the other hand, 
indicators which rely on less liquid assets (like the share of bank deposits in foreign currency in 
broad money) have shown a positive evolution3. In the light of this evidence, the center of 
attention in the dollarization literature has shifted from the early concept of currency substitution, 
to privilege the role of money as a store of value under the concept of “asset substitution”. By 
asset substitution we understand the process by which the local currency is rejected as a store of 
value leading to “financial dollarization”, namely, the holding by residents of foreign currency 
denominated assets and liabilities (Levy Yeyati (2003 and 2004)). 
 
To the extent that our emphasis when talking about “dollarization” has changed, the reasons that 
justify our concerns regarding this phenomenon also require a revision. While empirical evidence 
regarding the consequences of financial dollarization on the effectiveness of monetary policy 
                                               
2 See Calvo and Vegh (1997) for a comprehensive survey on this topic. 
3 See Reinhart, et al. (2003) for an excellent survey on the evolution of dollarization in the developing world. By means of a 
broad measure of dollarization, they conclude that both the degree and incidence of this phenomenon have increased 
significantly over the last two decades. On the other hand, and via an indirect measure based on the average velocity of base 
money, they find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the fall in the demand for domestic currency for transactional 
purposes (due to the high inflation episode of the 1980s) has been abated by the late 1990s.  
 
3 
seems inconclusive4,  stronger arguments (both theoretical and empirical) can be found relating 
dollarization to financial fragility. This fragility stems from a combination of large and frequent 
exchange rate shocks and the existence of currency mismatches somewhere in the economy. 
These mismatches are typically introduced in the balance sheet of “liability dollarized” firms 
working in the non-tradable sector. In analytical grounds, and if we link financial costs to 
entrepreneurial net worth in a manner similar to that suggested in the “financial accelerator” 
literature5, currency mismatches will lead, in the event of a real depreciation, to a deterioration in 
firm’s net worth and access to credit, and this will amplify the real effects of a negative external 
shock6. 
 
Now that vas consensus has been reached regarding the reasons that justify our concern about 
the dollarization phenomenon, the understanding of its driving forces and the possibility of 
suggesting a dedollarization agenda have recently been placed at the forefront of the policy 
debate. 
 
The literature emphasizes two approaches to understand the causes of financial dollarization. 
The first approach (stressed in Levy Yeyati (2003) and Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003)) 
underlines the role of the regulatory framework. If there is a relatively high coverage and no 
discrimination against dollar deposits under the deposit insurance scheme, the banking system 
will fail to internalize the exchange rate risk in their pricing decisions. 
  
In an environment characterized by a high correlation between exchange rate risk and banks’ 
solvency (a salient feature of liability dollarized economies), banks will fail to internalize the 
higher cost of dollar deposits relative to local currency (peso) deposits in the event of a 
depreciation, since it is precisely under such event that the bank is more likely to default. This, 
combined with the higher peso-dollar spread demanded by risk neutral depositors under a 
                                               
4 The analysis presented in Reinhart, et al. (2003) suggests that a high degree of dollarization does not preclude monetary 
policy from attaining its goal of price stability. Levy Yeyati (2004), on the other hand, finds a positive relation between 
financial dollarization and inflation rates.  
5 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989 and 1999). 
6 General equilibrium models which address the consequences of currency mismatches due to liability dollarization within a 
financial accelerator framework can be found in Céspedes, et al. (2000), Gertler, et al. (2001) and Castro, et al. (2004). 
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liquidation policy that recognizes the denomination of claims7, makes dollar funding more 
attractive for banks and induces deposit dollarization. This effect is reinforced by the existence 
of a deposit insurance scheme that fails to discriminate between currencies. In fact, the deposit 
insurance, by increasing the fraction of dollar deposits recovered, widens the peso-dollar 
spread demanded by depositors, while banks still fail to  internalize the higher costs of dollar 
funding in the bad states of nature, at the expense of the deposit insurance agency.  
 
Besides the explicit coverage provided by the deposit insurance fund, the scenario described 
above could also be the result of an implicit insurance provided by government bail-outs 
implemented to avoid systemic risk. This argument (so-called too-many-to-fail, (Levy Yeyati 
(2003)) relies, precisely, in the assumption that the government will have to intervene ex post 
(through debt buyout programs or capital strengthening programs) to avoid a financial crisis. 
 
Moreover, and at the other side of the balance sheet, the existence of an explicit or implicit 
insurance will also create an incentive for financial intermediaries to avoid transferring all the 
exchange rate risk to creditors when funding peso-generating projects. This will broaden 
currency mismatches (in banks’ or firms’ balance sheets) and increase the correlation between 
exchange rate risk and default risk. As a consequence, the driving force behind Broda and 
Levy Yeyati’s (2003) model will be reinforced leading to more financial dollarization: dollar 
assets will become even more attractive for depositors, while banks’ will now have weaker 
incentives to internalize the costs of dollar funding. 
 
Moving towards risk averse depositors implies moving towards the second argument when 
talking about the driving forces behind dollarization: the portfolio approach. This approach 
stresses the importance of the relative volatility between inflation and real depreciation as a 
key determinant of financial dollarization. Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) use an asset 
substitution model, CAPM (Capital Assets Portfolio Model), to formalize the previous 
statement. In particular, their model predicts that the degree of deposit and credit dollarization 
(given by the equilibrium in the financial market) is determined by the portfolio that ensures a 
                                               
7 Dollar claims under a liquidation are recognized at the expense of peso claims when the liquidation has been triggered by a 
depreciation.  
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minimum variance. This portfolio is a function of inflation and real depreciation volatilities. 
Thus, the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) is the natural benchmark to measure the degree 
of financial dollarization, and relate it to macroeconomic variables which might be influenced 
by policy decisions.  
 
Given the importance of second moments in the composition of depositors and creditors 
portfolio, an increase in the relative volatility of inflation (with respect to real depreciation 
volatility) will increase the dollarization ratio. This happens as the relative hedging 
opportunities offered by domestic currency assets fall. Based on the importance of relative 
volatilities, this approach should allow us to explain high and persistent financial dollarization 
ratios despite the introduction of a successful stabilization program. In fact, the MVP should 
not change if this program is accompanied by a policy aimed at mitigating exchange rate 
shocks.  
 
If the confront the above argument with the data, however, we can identify significant and 
systematic deviations between basic CAPM predictions and observed dollarization ratios. Peru 
is a salient case. In particular, the relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation has 
experienced a sharp decline in the last decade, while financial dollarization has remained 
around 70%. In fact, the dollar composition of the Peruvian MVP according to Ize and Levy 
Yeyati’s (2003) setting systematically underestimates observed financial dollarization. 
 
As in the current literature (see, for example, Ize (2005)), we do agree in the relevance of a 
MVP as an appropriate tool to understand, measure and ultimately design policy options 
aimed at mitigating financial dollarization. However, and confronted with the empirical 
evidence, we also believe there are several elements missing in the basic CAPM formulation 
for it to yield the MVP around which observed dollarization should lie.  
 
In fact, and if this model’s outcomes rely on the hedging opportunities offered by peso and 
dollar denominated assets (via their perceived relative volatility), the existence of a deposit 
insurance should also have a role in the portfolio approach. Moreover, and as already 
mentioned, another salient feature of financially dollarized economies is the existence of a 
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high correlation between exchange rate risk and default risk. Therefore, real exchange rate 
fluctuations should also be allowed to affect perceived relative volatilities through the 
existence of a default scenario for the local portfolio.  
 
In this way, we will be able to build an argument that draws from the two approaches 
discussed above. In particular, portfolio considerations will provide the framework to model 
the relative attractiveness of dollar assets as a hedging instrument. On the other hand, the two 
basic ingredients of the regulatory framework approach (the existence of a default scenario 
linked to real exchange shocks and the presence of currency-blind regulations), will enrich the 
set of determinants of this “relative attractiveness” and provide new means to understand (and 
policy options to modify) the dollar composition of the MVP.  
 
Taking the above in consideration, the objective of this paper is to provide an extension to the 
basic CAPM formulation by allowing the existence of a default scenario for a sufficiently 
large real depreciation, and the presence of a deposit insurance scheme which is triggered 
under this scenario. The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we present the 
model and discuss its results analytically. In Section 3 we calibrate the model with Peruvian 
data and compare its predictions with those of the basic CAPM. Finally, in Section 4 we 
conclude and suggest some avenues for further research. 
 
 
2 The Model 
In this section we extend Ize and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) minimum variance portfolio model. As 
in the original setting, depositor’s preferences are set to maximize: 
 
DU E(r) c Var(r)/2= -     (1.) 
 
where r is the real average return of the portfolio and Dc 0>  captures the degree of risk 
aversion. The key element in the model are the assets available for the portfolio choice and the 
type of shock that affects the realized return of each asset. 
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Following the definitions of the original model, there are three assets available for the 
portfolio choice: local currency deposits in the domestic banking system (DH), foreign 
currency deposits in the domestic banking system (DF), and cross-border foreign currency 
deposits (DC). Realized real returns (discounted with the domestic price index) of these three 
assets are given by: Hr , Fr  and Cr , respectively. In accordance with the price index used to 
build real returns, Hr  is subject to inflation surprises ( )pm , while 
Fr  and Cr  are both subject to 
real depreciation surprises s( )m . In addition, it is assumed that real returns for locally held 
assets are subject to a confiscation shock c( )m , which is uncorrelated with inflation and real 
depreciation surprises. 
 
In order to extend this model and incorporate a default scenario linked to real exchange rate 
shocks, we further assume the existence of a critical size for the real depreciation 
surprise *( )d that triggers default. In terms of the discussion that motivates this analysis, this 
means we are assuming that “balance sheet effects” matter and have pervasive effects for a 
sufficiently large real depreciation8. The existence of a default scenario brings the deposit 
insurance scheme into our analysis. In particular, we assume that this scheme recognizes a 
percentage ( )a of the realized real return on locally held deposits. 
 
Given all the above, real returns for the three types of asset can be expressed as: 
 
( )
( )
F
s s C sF
F
F s s C s
r * i f  *  
r
r * if *
ì + m m < d + m m < dï= í
é ùa + m m ³ d + m m ³ dï ë ûî
   (2.) 
 
( )
( )
H
s C sH
H
H s C s
r * i f  *  
r
r * if *
p
p
ì - m m < d + m m < dï= í
é ùa - m m ³ d + m m ³ dï ë ûî
   (3.) 
 
                                               
8 An example of this was the combined impact of the Asian and Russian crisis on the Peruvian economy. As a consequence of 
the crisis, seven banks (out of 25) were intervened and closed. A detailed account of the financial crisis of those years can be 
found in Morón and Loo-Kung (2003). 
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( )
( )
C
s s sC
C
s s s
r * if  *  
r
r * if *
ì + m m < d m < dï= í
+ m m ³ d m ³ dïî
    (4.) 
 
where r  denotes real returns in the absence of surprises, and F H,a a  denote the percentage 
covered by the deposit insurance for locally held dollar and peso assets, respectively. 
 
The confiscation shock is assumed to be distributed with mean cero and variance 2Cs . Inflation 
and real depreciation surprises are assumed to be jointly normally distributed9: 
 
2
S S S
2
S
0
N ,
0
p
p p p
é ùm æ ös sé ù æ ö
ê úç ÷ç ÷ê úm s sê úè øë û è øë û
:      (5.) 
 
If we let F Cx ,x  define the dollar shares of the portfolio, its real return will be given by: 
 
H F C
F C F Cr (1 x x )r x r x r= - - + +     (6.) 
 
and its first two moments are defined by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H F CF C F CE r (1 x x )E r x E r x E r= - - + +    (7.) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 H 2 F 2 C H F
F C F C F C F
H C F C
F C C F C
Var r (1 x x ) Var r x Var r x Var r 2(1 x x )x Cov r ,r ...
... 2(1 x x )x Cov r , r 2x x Cov r , r
= - - + + + - - +
+ - - +
 
(8.) 
 
Thus, and for a given degree of risk aversion, the optimal composition of depositors’ portfolio 
is given by the solution to the following optimization problem10: 
                                               
9 Normality will ease the analytical tractability of our results. 
10 The reader can check the analytical solution to this problem in the appendix of Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003). 
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( )
F C Dx ,x
Max E(r) c Var(r)/2
s.t. (7) and (8)
-
  
 
As is Ize and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) formulation, however, we are ultimately interested in the 
peso and dollar share of the minimum variance portfolio. If we let F C,l l  define the dollar 
shares of the MVP (local and cross-border, respectively), F C*l = l + l  should yield the degree 
of financial dollarization around which the observed ratio should lie (the degree of 
“underlying dollarization”, as defined by the authors). 
 
Thus,  F C,l l  can be obtained from the values of F Cx , x  that solve:  
 
( )
F Cx ,x
Min Var(r) s.t. (8)  
 
From (8.) is clear that the solution to the above problem requires solving for the unconditional 
second moments of Hr , Fr  and Cr . Given the way in which we have defined these real returns, 
their unconditional variances and covariances will be a function of their variances and means 
conditioned over the real depreciation surprise. Since real returns have been defined for two 
different states of nature over the entire support of the distribution of real depreciation shocks, 
it is worth noticing that conditioning would be trivial under full coverage of the deposit 
insurance ( )H F 1a = a = . Cross-border assets, on the other hand, are not covered by the 
deposit insurance but neither are subject to the default scenario considered in this analysis. 
Thus, cross-border returns mimic a situation where full coverage is granted. This implies that 
their variance can be directly computed as: c 2sVar(r ) = s .    
 
Let (.), (.)f F define the pdf and cdf of the normal distribution; s* *g = d s  denote the 
normalized critical depreciation size (the critical shock expressed as a number of standard 
deviations); and s sp pr = s s s . By using the general formula for the variance decomposition 
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in a joint distribution:  x xVar(y) Var E y x E Var y xé ù é ù= é ù + é ùë û ë ûë û ë û , it can be shown (see 
Appendix A) that variances for locally held assets are given by: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
F 2 2
s C
2
2 2 2
F s C
2
F
F s F
* *
Var(r ) * 1 * ...
* *
* *
... 1 * 1 * ...
1 * 1 *
1
... * r 1 * 1 * 1 ...
*
...
ì üé ùæ öf g f gï ïê ú= F g s - - g + s +ç ÷í ýç ÷F g F gê úï ïè øë ûî þ
ì üé ùæ öf g f gï ïê ú+ a - F g s - + g + s +ç ÷í ýç ÷- F g - F gê úï ïè øë ûî þ
ì üé ùï ïé ù+ F g - F g - a - s f g - - a +ê úí ýë û F gê úï ïë ûî þ
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
F F
F s F1 * r * 1 * 11 *
ì üé ùaï ï
+ - F g F g a - + s f g - a -é ù ê úí ýë û - F gê úï ïë ûî þ
  (9.) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
H 2 2
C
2 2
2 2 2
H C
H s
H H
s
* *
Var(r ) * 1 * ...
* *
* *
... 1 * 1 * ...
1 * 1 *
1
... * r 1 * 1 * 1
*
p
p
p
ì üé ùæ örf g r f gï ïê ú= F g s - - g + s +ç ÷í ýç ÷F g F gê úï ïè øë ûî þ
ì üé ùæ örf g r f gï ïê ú+ a - F g s - + g + s +ç ÷í ýç ÷- F g - F gê úï ïè øë ûî þ
ì üé ùsï ïé ù+ F g - F g - a + f g - - aê úí ýë û s F gê úï ë ûî þ
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
H s H
H H
s
...
... 1 * r * 1 * 1
1 *
p
+
ï
ì üé ùs aï ï
+ - F g F g a - - f g - a -é ù ê úí ýë û s - F gê úï ïë ûî þ
  (10.) 
 
By the same token, unconditional covariances between the three assets considered are given 
by: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
F H 2 2
C s F H C s
F H s
F s F H
* * * *
Cov(r ,r ) * 1 * 1 * 1 *
* * 1 * 1 *
1
* r 1 * 1 * 1 r 1 * 1
*
p p
ì ü ì üé ù é ùæ ö æ öf g f g f g f gï ï ï ïê ú ê ú= F g s - s - - g + a a - F g s - s - + gç ÷ ç ÷í ý í ýç ÷ ç ÷F g F g - F g - F gê ú ê úï ï ï ïè ø è øë û ë ûî þ î þ
ì üé ù sï ïé ù é ù+F g - F g - a - s f g - - a - F g - a +ê úí ýë û ë ûF gê úï ïë ûî þ
( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H
s
F HF s H
F s F H H
s
1
* 1
*
1 * r * 1 * 1 r * 1 * 1
1 * 1 *
p
p
ì üé ùï ïf g - - aê úí ý
s F gê úï ïë ûî þ
ì üì üé ù é ùa s aï ïï ï+ - F g éF g a - ù + s f g - a - éF g a - ù - f g - a -ê ú ê úí ýí ýë û ë û- F g s - F gê ú ê úï ïï ïë û ë ûî þî þ
(11.) 
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( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2
H C
s H s
H s
s H H
s
H s
s H
* * * *
Cov(r , r ) * * 1 1 * * 1
* * 1 * 1 *
1
* r 1 * 1 * 1
*
* r * 1
p p
p
p
ì ü ì üé ù é ùæ ö æ öf g f g f g f gï ï ï ïê ú ê ú= F g s + g - + a - F g s - g -ç ÷ ç ÷í ý í ýç ÷ ç ÷F g F g - F g - F gê ú ê úï ï ï ïè ø è øë û ë ûî þ î þ
ì üé ùsï ïé ù- s f g - F g - a + f g - - aê úí ýë û s F gê úï ïë ûî þ
s
+ s f g éF g a - ù -ë û ( ) ( )
( )H H
s
* 1
1 *
ì üé ùaï ïf g - a -ê úí ý
s - F gê úï ïë ûî þ
        (12.) 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
F C 2 2
s F s
F
s F s F
F
s F s
* * * *
Cov(r , r ) * 1 * 1 * 1 *
* * 1 * 1 *
1
* r 1 * 1 * 1
*
* r * 1 *
ì ü ì üé ù é ùæ ö æ öf g f g f g f gï ï ï ïê ú ê ú= F g s - - g + a - F g s - + gç ÷ ç ÷í ý í ýç ÷ ç ÷F g F g - F g - F gê ú ê úï ï ï ïè ø è øë û ë ûî þ î þ
ì üé ùï ïé ù- s f g - F g - a - s f g - - aê úí ýë û F gê úï ïë ûî þ
a
+ s f g éF g a - ù + s f gë û ( )
( )F F 11 *
ì üé ùï ï- a -ê úí ý
- F gê úï ïë ûî þ
          (13.) 
 
Clearly, and given the above expressions, the optimal dollar share of the MVP will be far more 
convoluted than the solution proposed in the basic model. In fact, Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) 
show that *l can be expressed as a simple ratio of second moments of inflation and real 
depreciation surprises: 
2
s
2 2
s s
*
2
p p
p p
s + s
l =
s + s + s
,     (14.) 
 
from where is clear that the relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation is a key 
determinant of the degree of underlying dollarization.  
 
However, it is worth noticing that Ize and Levy Yeyati’s setting and results are both a special 
case of this model. In particular, and as already mentioned, we have defined two states of 
nature which include the entire support of the distribution of real depreciation surprises. 
Therefore, we can identify two situations in which our model would mimic the basic model’s 
results: (i) when conditioning is not binding (the shock required to trigger default is 
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sufficiently large; *g ® ¥ )11; or (ii) when full coverage is granted by the deposit insurance 
scheme ( )H F 1a = a = . 
 
Given the above, our model’s optimal composition of the MVP will be different from that of 
the basic setting under a situation where the probability of default is non-trivial (balance sheet 
effects constitute a latent risk for financial stability), and the deposit insurance scheme grants 
less than perfect coverage. In order to explore this novel feature, two key elements remain to 
be uncovered: in what direction does our model’s results differ from those of the basic CAPM 
formulation, and what is the role of the size of the critical depreciation that triggers default. 
 
2.1 The MVP and the size of the fear 
As in the basic model, and for a sufficiently low country risk, one of the key determinants of 
the dollar share of the MVP is the volatility of peso returns relative to that of locally held 
dollar returns: H FVar(r ) Var(r ) . In fact, it is clear from expressions (9.) and (10.) that for a 
sufficiently large *g  or full coverage (and if we let 2c 0s ® ), the above ratio converges to 
2 2
sps s . 
 
Therefore, and in order to try to uncover some of the main implications of our model, we will 
focus on the new expressions given for the variances of returns for locally held peso and dollar 
assets. For simplicity, and in order to exploit the existence of a default scenario linked to real 
depreciation disturbances, we will assume a situation where no coverage is granted  
( )H F 0a = a = . Given this, and if we let 2c 0s ® , expressions (9.) and (10.) simplify to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
F 2
s
2 2F 2 F
s s
*
Var(r ) * * * ...
*
1 *
... r * 1 * * 2 * r 1 *
*
ì üf gï ï= s F g - g f g - +í ý
F gï ïî þ
é ù- F g
+ F g - F g + s f g - f g s - F gê ú
F gê úë û
  (15.) 
                                               
11 Since we are considering a normal distribution for real depreciation surprises, a threshold value of 3 would suffice to 
guarantee that truncation is not relevant.   
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( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
H 2 2
2 2H 2 2 H
*
Var(r ) * * * ...
*
1 *
... r * 1 * * 2 * r 1 *
*
p
p p
ì ür f gï ï= s F g - g r f g - +í ýF gï ïî þ
é ù- F g
+ F g - F g + s r f g + rf g s - F gê ú
F gë û
  (16.) 
 
Where the first expression at the right hand side of both equations represents the mean of the 
conditional variance, while the second and third sum up the variance of the conditional mean. 
 
Let us now focus on the role of the size of the critical depreciation that triggers default. A 
smaller value for *g  implies a higher probability of default and, in accordance with the title 
that motivates this analysis, let us portray small values of *g  as implying the existence of a 
larger “fear”.  
 
From (15.) and (16.) it is clear that a larger “fear” translates into a reduction in the mean of the 
conditional variance. In fact, the mean of the conditional variance is monotonically increasing 
in *g : 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F F
H H
F 2 F
s s s* *0 0
H 2 H
s s* *0 0
lim E Var r ; lim E Var r 0
lim E Var r ; lim E Var r 0
g ® ¥ g ®-¥a = a =
pg ® ¥ g ®-¥a = a =
ì ü ì üé ù é ùm = s m =í ý í ýë û ë ûî þ î þ
ì ü ì üé ù é ùm = s m =í ý í ýë û ë ûî þ î þ
  (17.) 
 
The variance of the conditional mean, on the other hand, is a non-monotonic function of *g . 
In particular, it will converge to zero as *g ® ¥  or *g ®-¥ . For sufficiently low absolute 
values of Hr  and Fr  (peso and dollar real returns in the absence of surprises), however, the 
first effect will dominate and we can claim that unconditional variances will fall as *g drops.  
 
In other words, and in a situation where the effect over the conditional variance dominates, a 
larger “fear” will conduce to a reduction in the variance of both locally held peso and dollar 
assets. This occurs because we are effectively truncating the distribution from where real 
depreciation and inflation disturbances are drawn. 
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Now, and in order to translate these effects into the composition of the MVP, we need to 
analyze their implications on the relative variance of peso and dollar assets. For this, we will 
continue focusing on a situation where the effect of *g  on the conditional variance dominates. 
Thus, and for sufficiently low values of Hr  and Fr , we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
2 2
H
F 2
2
s
*
* * *
*Var(r )
Var(r ) *
* * *
*
p
ì üé ùf gï ïs F g - r g f g +ê úí ýF gê úï ïë ûî þ»
ì üé ùf gï ïs F g - g f g +ê úí ý
F gê úï ïë ûî þ
   (18.) 
 
2H
F 2
s
Var(r ) A
; A B  if  0 1
Var(r ) B
ps» > £ r <
s
    (19.) 
 
Equations (18.) and (19.) suggest a corrected version of the relative variance of inflation and 
real depreciation (the key determinant of the composition of the MVP). In particular, and to 
the extent in which inflation and real depreciation surprises remain less than perfectly 
correlated, the correction term introduced (A/B) will be greater than one, and our model will 
be able to predict a larger dollar share in the MVP than the basic CAPM formulation.  
 
Moreover, this correction term is a decreasing function of *g  and, thus, the difference 
between this model’s *l  and Ize and Levy Yeyati’s *l  will the greater, the larger the size of 
the “fear”.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
2
2 2 * *A Bsign sign B A * B A ( *) * 2 * ( ) 
* * *
since A B
ì üé ùæ öf g f gé¶ ù ï ï= - f g + r - g f g + g + = -ê úç ÷í ýê ú ç ÷¶g F g F gê úë û è øï ïë ûî þ
>
 
Summarizing, our model can explain deviations from the dollar share of the MVP predicted by 
the basic CAPM setting, which depend on the probability that a real depreciation surprise 
triggers a financial crisis and, thus, default for locally held assets (the size of the “fear”). In 
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particular, the optimal composition of our MVP can call for a larger share of dollar assets and, 
under this scenario, the degree of underlying dollarization will be an increasing function of the 
degree of credit risk. 
 
The key element for this result is the link between credit risk and the shock that affects real 
returns for dollar assets: real exchange rate disturbances. This, together with the presence of 
inflation surprises that remain less than perfectly correlated with real depreciation shocks, 
implies that returns for dollar assets become relatively less volatile than peso returns.  
 
In terms of the distributions from where shocks that affect dollar and peso returns are drawn, 
our claim is that if default can be driven by real depreciation surprises, truncation will directly 
act upon the distribution of dollar returns while only indirectly upon the distribution of peso 
returns12, thus reducing the volatility of the former vis-à-vis that of the latter.   
 
3 The Peruvian Fear 
In the preceding section we have tried to uncover some of the main implications of our model, 
and analyze in which way can it predict a different composition of the MVP connecting this 
result to the existence of a non-trivial probability of default linked to real exchange rate 
disturbances. 
 
In this section, our goal is to test this model and its implications using Peruvian data. For this, 
we simulated numerical solutions to the problem:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F Cx ,x
2 H 2 F 2 C H F
F C F C F C F
H C F C
F C C F C
F C
Min Var(r)
s.t. Var r (1 x x ) Var r x Var r x Var r 2(1 x x )x Cov r ,r ...
... 2(1 x x )x Cov r , r 2x x Cov r , r
and  0 x 1, 0 x 1 
= - - + + + - - +
+ - - +
£ £ £ £
 
 
                                               
12 In the extreme case where r = 0, incidental truncation will be irrelevant for inflation shocks. This will imply that 
realizations from the entire support of t he inflation distribution can occur, regardless of the realized real depreciation shock.   
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using expressions (9.) to (13.) and c 2sVar(r ) = s  to build all necessary second moments. 
Simulations were made for every year in the period 1998-2004, using observed inflation, real 
depreciation and average real returns to build 2 2 H Fs s, , , r , and rp ps s s . Average coverage from 
the deposit insurance scheme, on the other hand, was calculated as the weighted average of the 
coverage granted for each deposit size in the ranges reported by the National Banking 
Superintendency (NBS)13. Weights were the total value of deposits in each range, as reported 
by the NBS. For each year, we computed solutions for values of *g  between 0.75 and 1.5. 
 
Table and Graph No. 1 present the results of our simulation exercise and compare them with 
the predictions of the basic model. The first result that is worth noticing is that the dollar share 
of the basic model’s MVP (as expressed in equation (14.)) systematically underestimates 
observed end-of-period dollarization ratios. In fact, the relative volatility of inflation with 
respect to that of the real exchange rate declined at a faster rate than financial dollarization 
during the 90s, opening a gap between observed and predicted dollarization.  
 
Table No. 1 
The Basic vs. Our Model’s Predictions  
 
Period /1 
Observed 
dollarization (%) /2 
Basic model’s l* 
(%) 
Our model’s l* 
g* = 0.75 (%) 
Our model’s l* 
g* = 1.5 (%) 
Dec-1998 68.56 74.28 90.74 81.61 
Dec-1999 71.11 34.90 64.39 48.30 
Dec-2000 73.27 45.40 70.49 57.06 
Dec-2001 73.90 55.92 75.43 65.26 
Dec-2002 73.44 63.19 78.85 70.87 
Dec-2003 71.63 63.69 78.44 71.01 
Dec-2004 69.38 61.54 75.96 68.81 
/1 Unconditional second moments for inflation and the real exchange rate, as well as average real returns for 
locally held dollar and peso (sol) assets, were computed using historic data with an increasing window size 
of 5 (for Dec-1998) to 11 (for Dec-2004) years. This allowed us to use all available information since Jan-
1994. 
/2 Computed as the ratio (DF+DC) / (DF+DC+DH); DH expressed in dollars. 
                                               
13 The Peruvian deposit insurance scheme recognized a maximum deposit value of around US$ 22,000 during the period 
1998-2004. 
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Graph No. 1 
The Basic vs. Our Model’s Predictions  
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The above result implies that the ratio 2 2sps s  is not a sufficient statistic to explain the 
dynamics of financial dollarization in the Peruvian economy. Recall that one of the main 
conclusions derived from the basic model is that we should be able to explain high and 
persistent financial dollarzation despite the introduction of a successful stabilization program, 
if this is accompanied by a fear-of-floating-type behavior by the central bank. Obviously, this 
argument (summarized in the ratio 2 2sps s ) can help explain part of the phenomenon’s 
persistence, but our claim is that there is still a missing driving force behind financial 
dollarization which our model appears to be considering. 
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In fact, and as shown in Graph No. 1, it is possible to find a value for *g  that guarantees a 
better fit between observed and predicted dollarization14. In terms of the discussion in the 
previous section, this implies that the corrected relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real 
depreciation (as expressed in equation (18.)) proves to be a superior statistic than 2 2sps s  if we 
are to track the persistence of financial dollarization. These results support the claim that the 
missing ingredient in the basic model is the connection between credit risk and real 
depreciation surprises, being these surprises the ones that directly affect realized real returns 
for dollar assets. 
 
Finally, and taking the Dec-2004 prediction as a baseline, Graph No. 2 presents the results of 
simulating an increase in the threshold real depreciation shock up the point where truncation 
over the inflation and real depreciation distribution is no longer relevant. As predicted in the 
preceding section, lowering the size the of “fear” leads to a reduction in the degree of 
underlying dollarization15. 
                                               
14 It is worth noticing that the size of the “fear” required to minimize the difference between observed and predicted 
dollarization falls monotonically since 1999. In fact, it comes as no surprise the “fear” reached a peak around this year, since 
the combined effect of the Russian (Sept-1998) and Brazilian crises (Jan-1999) turned evident the existence of pervasive 
balance sheet effects in the Peruvian economy (precisely the type of credit risk that our model is intended to capture). 
 
15 Increasing the threshold real depreciation shock that triggers default implies that all relevant second moments converge to 
the values considered in the basic model. Our model’s predictions, however, fail to converge to those of the basic model 
because our numerical simulation explicitly ruled out the possibility of short sales for every type of asset. The analytical 
solution to the basic model (given by equation (14.)), on the other hand, is the result of an unconstrained minimization 
problem. 
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Graph No. 2 
Reducing the “Fear” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research 
As shown in Ize (2005), the MVP is the only stable equilibrium under risk aversion. Based on 
this result, a significant strand of the debate concerned with the driving forces behind financial 
dollarization has focused on analyzing the determinants of the relative variability of inflation 
vis-à-vis that of real depreciation. In particular, the discussion has focused on identifying the 
diverse features of monetary policy that can affect the distributions from where inflation and 
real depreciation shocks are drawn. 
 
At the core of this discussion we can find two leading (and opposing) forces: inflation 
targeting and fear of floating. The former, by effectively reducing inflation variability, should 
help mitigate financial dollarization. The latter, on the other hand, by making dollar assets 
more attractive as hedging instruments, would act in the opposite direction. 
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This analysis has contributed in the identification of those factors that can end up altering the 
perceived distributions from were inflation and real exchange rate surprises can be drawn and, 
thus, the relative volatility of peso and dollar returns. In particular, the key ingredient of our 
model is the existence of local assets which face a credit risk that is directly linked to the 
shock that determines real returns for dollar denominated assets: unanticipated shifts in the 
real exchange rate. As shown, this ingredient can end up altering the perceived relative 
volatility of peso and dollar assets in a way that fuels financial dollarization (by increasing the 
relative hedging opportunities offered by the latter). 
 
This analysis has taken the degree of credit risk as given. In fact, we have assumed that risk 
averse depositors choose the optimal composition of their asset portfolio trying to minimize 
the variance of its returns, for a given probability of default which, in turn, depends on the 
realization of a sufficiently large real depreciation shock. Therefore, one possible extension to 
our model calls for endogenizing the threshold real depreciation shock that triggers default. 
One obvious candidate if we are to explain the size of this critical shock is the degree of 
financial dollarization. In fact, we can expect smaller depreciations to trigger default in highly 
dollarized economies as a result of the existence of pervasive currency mismatches. If this is 
the case, underlying dollarization as predicted by the MVP could be portrayed as a self-
reinforcing phenomenon.  
 
In fact, and is in Broda and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) setting, larger currency mismatches (driven 
by a high and persistent asset dollarization) would increase the size of the “fear” which will, in 
turn and according to our model’s results, fuel even more the degree of asset dollarization up 
to the point where the “fear” is maximized (default can be triggered by a very small real 
depreciation shock). On the other hand, any exogenous fall in the degree of financial 
dollarization could also be self-reinforced: the reduction in the size of the “fear” would fuel 
financial de-dollarization up to the point where the “fear” is minimized, and we will 
eventually end up with a degree of financial dollarization consistent with the predictions of the 
basic CAPM model. 
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Appendix A 
 
The general formula for the variance decomposition in a joint distribution: 
 
x xVar(y) E Var y x Var E y xé ù é ù= é ù + é ùë û ë ûë û ë û     (A1) 
 
states that the variance of y decomposes into mean of the conditional variance plus the 
variance of the conditional mean. In terms of the stochastic variables considered in this 
analysis, this amounts to: 
 
( ) ( )
( ){ } ( ){ }
i i i
s s s s
2 2
i i i i
s s s s
Var(r ) Pr * Var r * Pr * Var r * ...
... Pr * E r * E r Pr * E r * E r
é ù é ù= m < d m < d + m ³ d m ³ d +ë û ë û
é ù é ùé ù é ù+ m < d m < d - + m ³ d m ³ d -ë û ë ûë û ë û
     (A2) 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ){ }{ }
( ){ }{ }
i j i j i j
s s s s
i i j j
s s s
i i j j
s s s
Cov(r , r ) Pr * Cov r , r * Pr * Cov r , r * ...
... Pr * E r * E r E r * E r ...
... Pr * E r * E r E r * E r
é ù é ù= m < d m < d + m ³ d m ³ d +ë û ë û
é ù é ùé ù é ù+ m < d m < d - m < d - +ë û ë ûë û ë û
é ù é ùé ù é ù+ m ³ d m ³ d - m ³ d -ë û ë ûë û ë û
    (A3) 
 
from where it is clear that (A2) is a special case of (A3) when i j= . Given the assumption of 
normality for real depreciation surprises, and if we let s* *g = d s , we can define: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
s
s
Pr * *
Pr * 1 *
m < d = F g
m ³ d = - F g
     (A4) 
 
In order to build second moments for the three assets considered, we require expressions for 
means, variances and covariances conditioned over the real depreciation shock. From the 
expressions given in (2.), (3.) and (4.) in the main text, and since confiscation risk is 
uncorrelated with inflation and real depreciation surprises, it is clear that: 
 
{ }
{ }
F F F F
s s s s F s s
F 2 F 2 2
s s s c s F s s c
E r * r E * ; E r * r E *
Var r * Var * ; Var r * Var *
é ù é ùé ù é ùm < d = + m m < d m ³ d = a + m m ³ dë û ë ûë û ë û
é ù é ùé ù é ùm < d = m m < d + s m ³ d = a m m ³ d + së û ë ûë û ë û
 
(A5) 
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{ }
{ }
H H F H
s s s H s
H 2 H 2 2
s s c s H s c
E r * r E * ; E r * r E *
Var r * Var * ; Var r * Var *
p p
p p
é ù é ùé ù é ùm < d = - m m < d m ³ d = a - m m ³ dë û ë ûë û ë û
é ù é ùé ù é ùm < d = m m < d + s m ³ d = a m m ³ d + së û ë ûë û ë û  
              (A6) 
{ }
F H 2
s s s c
F H F H 2
s s s c
Cov r ,r * Cov , * ;
Cov r ,r * Cov , *
p
p
é ù é ùm < d = - m m m < d + së ûë û
é ù é ùm ³ d = -a a m m m ³ d + së ûë û
                 (A7) 
 
F C
s s s
F C F
s s s
Cov r ,r * Var * ;
Cov r ,r * Var *
é ù é ùm < d = m m < dë ûë û
é ù é ùm ³ d = a m m ³ dë ûë û
                            (A8) 
 
H C
s s s
H C H
s s s
Cov r , r * Cov , * ;
Cov r , r * Cov , *
p
p
é ù é ùm < d = - m m m < dë ûë û
é ù é ùm ³ d = - a m m m ³ dë ûë û
                           (A9) 
 
Given the joint distribution assumed for inflation and real depreciation surprises: 
 
2
S S S
2
S
0
N ,
0
p
p p p
é ùm æ ös sé ù æ ö
ê úç ÷ç ÷ê úm s sê úè øë û è øë û
: , 
 
finding an expression for all required first and second moments amounts to the application of 
the general formulae for conditional means and variances in a normal bivariate (of the class 
typically used when analyzing truncation and incidental truncation). If we let s sp pr = s s s , 
these are:  
 
( )
( )
s s s
2
s s s
E truncation over µ 0 *
Var truncation over µ 1 *
é ùm = + s l gë û
é ùm = s - d gé ùë ûë û
                          (A10) 
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( )
( )
s
2 2
s
s
s s s s s2
s
E truncation over µ 0 *
Var truncation over µ 1 *
Cov , truncation over µ Var truncation over µ 1 *
p p
p p
p
p p
é ùm = +rs l gë û
é ùé ùm = s - r d gë û ë û
s
é ù é ùm m = m = s - d gé ùë ûë û ë ûs
        (A11) 
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where: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
s
s
*
 if truncation is *
*
*
*
 if truncation is *
1 *
f gì
- m < dï F gïl g = í
f gï m ³ dï - F gî
    (A12) 
 
 
and  ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *d g = l g l g - gé ùë û . 
 
Equations (9.) and (10.) in the main text can be obtained by evaluating (A2) considering 
expressions given in (A5) plus (A10), and (A6) plus (A11), respectively. Finally, all three 
covariances (equations (11.), (12.), and (13.) in the main text) can be obtained by evaluating 
(A3) considering expressions given in (A7) to (A9), the general formula for the conditional 
covariance given in (A11), and the appropriate conditional means. 
